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Common-Sense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition, by Nicholas 
Rescher. Marquette University Press, 2005. Pp. 270. $20 (cloth).
TED POSTON, University of South Alabama
Nicholas Rescher continues his prodigious output with this book, a prod­
uct of his 2005 Aquinas Lecture. Rescher's aim is to consider the proper 
place of common sense in philosophy. He accomplishes this with a wide 
ranging survey of issues common sense may bear on. Rescher's overall 
conclusion is that common sense has an important bearing on philosophi­
cal doctrine and method.
In the first chapter, "Common-Sense Knowledge and its Nature," Re- 
scher presents his view of the nature of common sense. He distinguishes 
between common-sense principles and common-sense judgments. Com­
mon sense judgments need to be grounded in a general common sense 
principle (p. 38). A common-sense principle is a general rule governing 
the determination of common-sense truths (p. 36). The common-sense 
principle is likewise a matter of common sense. The key feature of these 
principles is that they reflect "the general experience of mankind in meet­
ing human needs" (p. 38). Rescher views common sense as inherently 
pragmatic. He writes that the aim of common sense is "to achieve a ratio­
nally grounded commonality (uniformity) of opinion and evaluation in a 
commonalty of agents dependent on cooperative and collaborative action 
in meeting human needs" (p. 42).
In chapter two, "The Rationale of Common-Sense Knowledge," Re- 
scher explains that the domain of common sense facts is limited to our 
pre-theoretical view of the world and our place in it (p. 52). This point 
follows naturally from his pragmatic conception of common sense. The 
authority of common sense lies in the fact that common sense is a useful 
guide to life and has proven a useful guide to life for many other individu­
als both in the past and in the present (p. 63). Rescher here advocates a 
view similar to critical commonsensism (p. 59). He avers that the claims 
of common sense are not irrefragable certainties. They are powerful pre­
sumptions that should be abandoned only in "very unusual conditions" 
(p. 57). He closes the chapter with passing responses to objections to com­
mon sense (pp. 64-9). One of the objections he doesn't consider here is that 
common sense is inconsistent. He briefly considers this earlier, alluding to 
an article by Peter Unger on common sense. Interestingly, Rescher doesn't 
dispute that common sense is inconsistent. He instead observes that in­
consistency afflicts rational inquires in general and thus concludes that 
"common sense is at no disadvantage vis-a-vis the products of rational 
inquiry in general" (p. 55). Perhaps Rescher's point is that the mere pres­
ence of inconsistency isn't a sufficient reason for the wholesale rejection of 
common sense.
In the third chapter, "Certainty and Skepticism in the Light of Common 
Sense," Rescher addresses the skeptical argument that since we cannot be 
certain that skeptical possibilities fail to obtain we cannot know matters 
of common sense. Rescher agrees with an assumption of this argument 
that knowledge implies certainty (p. 72). He explains, though, that cer­
tainty can be understood in two senses: certainty beyond any reasonable
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doubt and certainty beyond any possible doubt (p. 76). It is not clear from 
Rescher's exposition whether he thinks that 'certainty' is contextual or 
whether there are two different concepts of certainty. His response to the 
skeptical argument goes through more smoothly if he takes the contex- 
tualist route. On this route, skeptical possibilities do not get a grip. I can 
know there is a chair in the room because I am certain that plausible fal­
sifying circumstances don't obtain. I just walked over to the chair and 
sat down. After this response to the skeptic, Rescher appears to switch 
gears to consider another response to skepticism appealing to economic 
rationality. He reasons that we are economically rational in proceeding on 
the assumption that skeptical possibilities don't obtain (pp. 83-87). The 
appeal to economic rationality here is puzzling. If it's certain that skepti­
cal possibilities do not obtain then we needn't justify common sense by 
appealing to cost-effective concerns. The appeal to economic rationality 
treats the skeptical possibilities as live options whereas common sense 
completely dismisses skeptical scenarios.
In chapter four, "Common Sense, Trust, and Communication," Rescher 
provides an economic rationale for our trust in common sense and for the 
presumptions involved in communication. The overarching theme is that 
cost-benefit considerations and not factual considerations underwrite our 
basic trust in our senses and other people (pp. 98, 126). This chapter ex­
hibits a similar oddity with the last several pages of the previous chapter. 
The oddity is that Rescher's economic defense of common sense is unnec­
essary given his earlier response to skepticism. Once skeptical worries are 
adequately addressed we needn't belabor the point that common sense is 
largely accurate. Yet there is a deeper peculiarity with the chapter that lies 
in Rescher's claims that factual considerations don't underwrite our trust 
in common sense (pp. 98, 126). It's peculiar because factual considerations 
do underwrite this trust. That I receive a good report from the ophthal­
mologist underwrites my trust in relying on eyesight.
The fifth chapter, "Science and Common Sense" argues that common 
sense and the deliverances of science are not incompatible. Rescher stress­
es that common sense is distinct from common belief. The widespread 
belief in the pre-Copernican era that the Sun rotated around the Earth is 
merely a common belief; it is not "ground[ed] in a general principle that 
reflects the general experience of mankind in meeting human needs" (p. 
38). Rescher then reasons that common sense is inexact (pp. 140ff.). The 
correctness of common sense lies in its indefiniteness (p. 141). As I un­
derstood it, the inexactness and indefiniteness of common-sense claims is 
that they have little content. The actual content of common-sense claims is 
weak enough so as to be compatible with most—if not all-developments 
in science and every serious philosophical position.
In the sixth chapter, "Universality and Common Sense in Moral Mat­
ters," Rescher argues that fundamental moral considerations—respect 
persons, don't inflict needless harm, etc.—are common sense. Moreover, he 
argues that these principles are inherent in moral concepts (p. 173). The 
person who abandons such principles is not engaged in the moral enter­
prise for conceptual reasons (p. 173). It is not clear what the argument is 
for this claim. Furthermore, it is unclear why we need this conceptual de­
fense of morality. Rescher begins the chapter with the challenge of moral
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relativism. It is sufficient to respond to that challenge by noting that the 
alleged claims made by relativists do not actually support relativism (a 
strategy Rescher employs throughout the chapter). Thus moral relativism 
does not conflict with common sense.
In the final chapter, "Common Sense in Philosophy," Rescher evalu­
ates the role common sense plays in philosophical deliberation. The up­
shot of this chapter is that common sense provides a weak constraint on 
philosophical deliberation, ruling out neither Berkeleyan idealism nor 
Humean skepticism. Furthermore, Rescher doesn't endorse Moore's use 
of common sense to rule out non-trivial philosophical positions. In this 
context Rescher's insistence that common sense "plays a significant role in 
philosophical deliberations" appears exaggerated (p. 234). The constraint 
common sense provides is merely that language must be used conform­
ably with usage and that departures from common sense are justifiable 
only when only when there are very good reasons to do so (p. 209).
The most interesting aspect of this study on common sense is Rescher's 
appeal to economic considerations to justify common sense. This strategy 
seems right insofar as one is concerned with utility maximization. Yet the 
epistemic issue remains. What epistemic rationale is there for thinking that 
matters of common sense tend to be correct? It is not clear how Rescher's 
economic justification of common sense bears on this question. Moreover, 
the issue of epistemic reasons apropos common sense can be raised for the 
utility assignments Rescher uses to provide the economic defense. Given 
such and such utility assignments it's economically rational to depend on 
the deliverances of common sense. Yet, one may wonder, what are the 
epistemic reasons for thinking that those are the right utility assignments? 
Rescher does not tell us. Nevertheless, Rescher's economic approach is 
appealing and it deserves a good run for its money.
